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CONCERNING THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
William Hasker 
Ever since Descartes there have been philosophers who have claimed that 
the unity of conscious experience argues strongly against the possibility 
that the mind or self is a material thing. My contention is that the recent 
neglect of this argument is a mistake, and that it places a serious and per-
haps insuperable obstacle in the way of materialist theories of the mind. 
Ever since Descartes1 there have been philosophers who have claimed that 
the unity of conscious experience argues strongly against the possibility 
that the mind or self is a material thing. This argument surfaced from time 
to time during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, but 
recently it has been neglected. My contention is that this neglect is a mis-
take, and that the argument places a serious and perhaps insuperable 
obstacle in the way of materialist theories of the mind. 
I 
The argument against materialism from the unity of consciousness is 
clearly present in Leibniz, as Margaret Wilson has shown.2 Indeed, the 
classic form given the argument in the Second Paralogism may well be 
viewed as Kant's reflective development of the argument taken from 
Leibniz. Kant's version goes as follows: 
Every composite substance is an aggregate of several substances, 
and the actions of a composite, or whatever inheres in it as thus 
composite, is an aggregate of several actions or accidents, distrib-
uted among the plurality of the substances. Now an effect which 
arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is indeed 
possible, nar:nely, when this effect is external only (as, for instance, 
the motion of a body is the combined motion of all its parts). But 
with thoughts, as internal accidents belonging to a thinking being, 
it is different. For suppose it be the composite that thinks: then 
every part of it would be a part of the thought,> and only all of 
them taken together would be the whole thought. But this cannot 
consistently be maintained. For representations (for instance, the 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 12 No.4 October 1995 
All rights reserved 
532 
Faith and Philosophy 
single words of a verse), distributed among different beings, never 
make up a whole thought (a verse), and it is therefore impossible 
that a thought should inhere in what is essentially composite. It is 
therefore possible only in a single substance, which, not being an 
aggregate of many, is absolutely simple." 
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In dubbing this a "paralogism," Kant seemingly invites us to regard it as 
wholly unsound-yet his own attitude towards the argument was far 
more complex than that.' We must remember, to be sure, that the chief 
objective of Kant's "transcendental psychologist" is to establish a specula-
tive proof of immortality. And it clearly is Kant's view that neither this 
argument nor any other can succeed in doing this. But in certain other 
respects, his assessment of the unity-of-consciousness argument is far from 
negative. On the contrary, in the second edition of the Critique he wrote, 
"From this [argument] follows the impossibility of any explanation in mate-
rialist terms of the constitution of the self as a merely thinking subject."" 
And the same claim is repeated in On the Progress of Metaphysics: " ... there-
fore materialism can never be used as a principle for explaining the nature 
of the soul."7 Allison summarizes Kant's attitude towards the argument as 
follows: 
Thus, Kant's position seems to be that the unity of consciousness, 
which the rational psychologist (presumably Leibniz) uses erro-
neously to establish the positive metaphysical doctrine of the sim-
plicity and hence incorruptibility of the soul, can be used legiti-
mately to establish the weaker thesis of the impossibility of a mate-
rialist explanation of the conceptual activities of the mind.R 
It has to be said that Kant's partially favorable attitude towards the argu-
ment has not been shared by his recent commentators and critics." But 
rather than pursue this debate in the Kantian context, I think it will be most 
helpful for us to move directly to a contemporary version of the argument. lO 
II 
First, we begin with some stipulations about the materialism against 
which the argument is directed. This materialism will be assumed to view 
the brain as a computer-like network of electro-chemical interconnections, 
processing sensory (and other) data much in the way a computer processes 
information. Each item of information held within the brain is modelled in 
the physical state of some portion of the brain. There is not conscious 
awareness of every item of information the brain contains, but awareness 
when it occurs consists of the brain, or some part thereof, being in the 
appropriate physical state. An important question here, still in dispute 
among brain scientists, is whether items of information are stored in dis-
crete sub-units of the brain, or whether information is stored "holographi-
cally"" so that any given item is spread over a large region of brain-tissue. 
In what follows, this question will be left open. 
As an example of the unity of consciousness, I cite my awareness of my 
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present visual field. l2 This field includes the impressions from a set of 
shelves in my apartment's living room, with books on the lower shelves 
and a number of plants, mostly miniature cacti, above them; behind there 
is the horizontal pattern of the mini-blinds. All this I observe without scan-
ning or refocusing my eyes: momentarily, as it were. This visual field is 
not unified in any interesting aesthetic sense, but it is a fact that I experi-
ence it as a unity, all at once and not as a succession of discrete 
experiences.13 
Before proceeding further, it will be helpful to see what our datum looks 
like as viewed from the perspectives of two contemporary schools of mate-
rialism. According to functionalism, my being aware of my conscious field 
is my being in a state with certain causal and functional properties. And 
according to eliminativism, what I describe as my being aware of my visu-
al field is a matter of certain parts of my brain being in certain physical 
states. Now, it may well be that my being aware of my visual field has 
exactly the causal and functional properties attributed to it by functional-
ism. And it might also be true that when I take myself to be aware of my 
visual field my brain is in such-and-such a physical state. But what I mean 
when I say that I am aware of my visual field is not that I am in a state with 
certain causal and functional properties, or that my brain is in such-and-
such a physical state. The meaning of the assertion that I am aware of my 
visual field is, I think, neither obscure nor difficult to grasp.14 Furthermore, 
I believe that, on many occasions, what is thus asserted by me is true. The 
reader, then, is invited to take this datum at face value and to investigate it 
in its own right, without first translating it into the argot either of function-
alism or of eliminativism.ls 
Now, my procedure is to take a specific conscious state-the state I am 
in when I am aware of my visual field, as described above-and ask what 
physical entity it is that is in that state. The question is surprisingly difficult 
for the materialist to answer. Initially, to be sure, the materialist may reply 
that the physical object which is aware of my visual field is I myself-that 
is, my body. But not all of my body is equally relevant to the state in ques-
tion; my brain, we generally believe, is essential to it in a way that other 
parts of my body are not. (The brain could be in a similar state even if it 
were in a vat.) So is it my brain, rather than I, that is aware of the visual 
field? This raises a question of terminology. When a person performs 
some action in virtue of some part of that person's body doing something, 
we sometimes say that the person has done something by means of the bodi-
ly part, and sometimes that the part itself has done it. (I point with my fin-
ger, but also my finger points.) It is not dear, in the case of mental states 
such as thinking and awareness, that one of these ways of speaking is more 
correct than the other: Do I "use my brain" to figure things out, or does 
my brain figure things out?lb In what follows, the latter form of speech will 
be employed, but all the points made will apply in either case. 
Let us say, then, that it is my brain that is aware of my visual field, and I 
am aware of it in virtue of my brain's being aware of it. But not all of my 
brain need be involved-some of it may be performing other functions 
which contribute indirectly or not at all to my awareness of my visual field. 
So let us narrow the focus even further. Let V be the smallest part of my 
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brain which contains the modelling of all of the information from my visu-
al field. The existence and functioning of V mayor may not be sufficient 
for my having the awareness of the field. But it clearly is necessary for the 
awareness, since if part of V is not functioning some of the information-
content of the field will be lost. 
Should we say, then, that it is V which is aware of the visual field? 
Perhaps so, but we need to consider the composition of V. In the light of 
the computer analogy sketched above, we can say that V is a whole com-
posed of physical parts. Many of these parts model information from vari-
ous parts of the visual field. But no proper part of V models all of this 
information, so it is not possible for any of these parts to be aware of the 
entire visual field. But if V is a whole composed of parts each of which is 
not aware of the visual field, how can V itself be aware of it? If we assume 
that each item of information is modelled in a discrete sub-unit of the 
brain, we might suppose that each sub-unit is aware of the information it 
contains, and that in virtue of this V is aware of the entire field. (On the 
holographic model, on the other hand, all of V is needed to carry the full 
information for any part of the visual field.) But even if the sub-units are 
assumed to be aware of the items of information they contain, this does not 
enable us to explain the awareness of the entire field; that is as if one were 
to say that each student in a class knows the answer to one question on an 
examination, and that in virtue of this the entire class knows the material 
perfectly! It is true that the members of the class are able, working togeth-
er, to reproduce all of the information, but there may in fact be no one at all 
who knows or is aware of all of it. The point is simply that the kind of 
awareness we are discussing is essentially unitary, and it makes no sense 
to suggest that it may be "parcelled out" to entities each of which does not 
have the awareness. A pe'rson's be'ing aware of a comple'x fact cannot consist of 
parts of the person being aware of parts of the fact. A conjunction of partial 
awarenesses does not add up to a total awareness.1? 
But may we not suppose that, in addition to the various sub-units which 
model items of information from the field, V also contains a scanning 
mechanism, 5, which collects and integrates the items of information and 
thus makes possible the unified awareness? We may of course suppose 
this. But note that for this mechanism to do what is required of it, 5 must 
somehow represent within itself simultalleously all of the information of the 
visual field. Now if 5 does contain all of this information (even if only 
momentarily), we must still reflect that 5 is itself a whole consisting of 
parts-and thus the argument begins all over again, with the same result 
as before. 
I think what one naturally wants to say at this point is something like 
the following: It may be, indeed must be, that the information from my 
visual field is distributed among a number of distinct brain-units. But this 
fact obviously does not make a unified consciousness impossible-it 
would, after all, be absurd to require that all of the information should 
somehow be concentrated into a mathematical point! Rather, what hap-
pens is that the various items of information are as it were drawn together 
and co-presented in a unified consciousness, and this process is not frus-
trated by the spatial "spread" of information within the brain. 
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It seems to me that something like this must be true. But note that "con-
sciousness," as used in the preceding paragraph, does not refer to a brain 
or to any part of a brain. So I repeat my question: what physical entity is it 
that is aware of my visual field? If materialism cannot answer this ques-
tion, it is in serious difficulty.'R 
For many materialists, the most appealing solution may lie in rejecting 
the demand, which is implicit in the discussion to this point/' that the 
properties attributed to the brain be accounted for in terms of properties of, 
and relations between, its parts. For an especially clear formulation of this 
demand, we turn to Wilfrid Sellars and his "principle of reducibility," 
which he states as follows: 
If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every proper-
ty of the object must consist in the fact that its constituents have 
such and such qualities and stand in such and such relations, or 
roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of proper-
ties of, and relations between, its constituents. 2L1 
Commenting on this principle, Sellars states: 
Telling us, as it does, that if an object is (as contrasted with is corre-
lated with) a whole of parts, its having P consists in its parts having 
properties and standing in relations" it also tells us that if an object 
has a property which violates the principle, then in that context it is 
correlated with rather than consists of the "parts."21 
Three points need to be noted with regard to Sellars' principle of 
reducibility. First: Sellars' name for his principle may suggest the notion 
of reduction as employed in the philosophy of science, but it would be a 
mistake to take it that way. This is a metaphysical principle, belonging, as 
Sellars says, "to logic or general ontology rather than to the philosophy of 
science."22 Second: Since the intention of the principle is metaphysical 
rather than epistemological, what is required is that the properties of the 
system shall consist in properties actually possessed by the parts, not neces-
sarily in those we know (or believe on independent evidence) to be pos-
sessed by them. (Thus, in some cases the requirements of the principle 
might be satisfied by postulating new, previously unknown, properties for 
the parts.) Third: The principle deals with the relations between the prop-
erties of a system and properties of its parts at a given time; it is, one might 
say, synchronic rather than diachronic. 
While I have little desire to plunge into a maze of Sellarsian exegesis, his 
expression "consists of" (or "in") requires some comment. I take it that 
Sellars is describing a situation in which a whole is nothing but a system of 
objects-where there is no such thing as a whole "over and above" the 
sum of the parts-in distinction from a situation in which there is such a 
whole which has properties of its own which cannot be accounted for in 
terms of the parts and their properties. The phrase can be helpfully illus-
trated by Sellars' own examples. The redness of a brick wall c01lsists ill the 
redness of its constituent bricks-the redness of the wall amounts to noth-
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ing over and above the fact that the visible surface of the wall is made up 
of the surfaces of the bricks (disregarding mortar lines), and those surfaces 
are red. And for a certain object to be a ladder "is for its parts to be of such 
and such shapes and sizes and to be related to one another in certain 
ways."21 In contrast, the pinkness of a pink ice cube does not consist in its 
constituent elementary particles having certain properties and standing in 
certain relations, for none of the particles have properties of which "being 
pink" could consist. (This helps to motivate Sellars' well-known contrast 
between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of man-in-the-
world, as well as the doctrine that the scientific image stands to the mani-
fest image as reality to appearance.) 
But perhaps "consists in" is still less than transparently clear; at the very 
least, we should like to have some criterion for determining when one 
property consists in other properties. My proposal for understanding this 
notion is as follows: A property of a whole consists in the properties of the 
parts if it follows from those properties by logical or conceptual necessity.24 
This exploits the familiar idea that, in a valid deductive argument, there is 
nothing in the conclusion that is not already "contained" in the premises. 
So we can say that 
If an object 0 is a system made up of elements el, e2, el, ... en, then 
all the properties of 0 are logical consequences of the properties 
of, and relations between, the ei. 23 
Thus, the fact that the visible surface of a wall is made up of red bricks, 
implies that the wall itself is red. (The color of an opaque object is the color 
of its visible surface; the visible surface of the wall is identical with the visi-
ble surfaces of the bricks that make it up; all the visible surfaces of the 
bricks are red; therefore, the wall is red.) And from the fact that an object 
consists of such-and-such bits of wood in such-and-such relations, it fol-
lows that the object is a ladder; one might say that it follows from the 
description that the object "fits the definition" of a ladder.26 On the other 
hand, it does not follow from the microphysical properties of an ice cube, 
that the cube is pink/7 and so pinkness is not a property of an ice cube con-
sidered as a system of subatomic particles.28 
I think it is clear that a computer is, in Sellars' phrase, "in a strict sense, a 
system of objects." It is the very fact that the computer's computational 
capabilities are deducible from, and thus explicable in terms of, the proper-
ties and relations of the computer's parts, that enables us to design com-
puters and to understand their functioning-and this, in turn, is just what 
makes the computer attractive as a model for the understanding of mind. 
But the unity-of-consciousness argument places an important barrier in the 
way of this project, by pointing to a property of the mind-my awareness 
of my present visual field-which is not a logical consequence of the prop-
erties of and relations between the brain's physical parts.'" 
We may conclude, then, that the mind is logically irreducible to the brain, 
in that it has properties which are not logically implied by the properties 
of, and relations between, the physical parts of the brain. But from this it 
follows, in view of the principle of reducibility, that the mind is also onto-
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logically irreducible to the brain; in Sellars' phrase, the mind is "correlated 
with" rather than "consists of" the brain's parts. This does not, to be sure, 
go very far towards telling us, in a positive sense, what the mind is or how 
its existence is to be explained. But it does tell us something about what 
the mind is not and about how its existence cannot be explained, and for a 
topic as contentious as this one that is a major gain. 
It would perhaps be generally conceded that, as things now stand, we do 
not see how such properties as "being aware of one's visual field" could 
be deduced from properties of, and relations between, the neurons in the 
brain. But is there any reason to believe this state of affairs is permanent? 
Is this not merely one more case in which we can confidently wait for the 
advance of science to relieve difficulties which at a given juncture seem 
insurmountable?'" 
It is always difficult to resist such appeals to the future progress of sci-
ence, in view of the astonishing progress which has already been made. 
Nevertheless, resistance may sometimes be called for. The difficulty in the 
present case is not merely that the particles of physics lack certain properties 
(e.g., color) that they apparently would need in order for the properties we 
find in the world to be deduced from them. What is at issue is that, whatev-
er properties we may encounter in the world, these properties are co-pre-
sented for us in a unified experience-or, we may also say, to a single subject. 
The notion that such an experience may in the final analysis not be the expe-
rience of a single subject-that in fact the experience inheres in a number of 
different entities, each of which does not have that experience as a whole-is 
I think simply unintelligible." 
The materialist who has followed the discussion to this point has in effect 
three options. She may take the heroic path laid out for her by elimina-
tivism, by simply denying that it is ever true that a person is aware of a visu-
al field (or of any other complex fact). Or, she may become a logical reduc-
tionist, asserting that such complex mental properties are after all logically 
derivable from the physical properties of the brain's parts. For many, how-
ever, the most applealing course may be to reject the principle of reducibility, 
enabling us to attribute to the brain as a whole (or to the person as a whole) 
properties which are not implied by the properties of and relations between 
its constituents. In order to explore this possibility, we will next consider an 
extremely interesting discussion of panpsychism initiated by Thomas Nagel. 
III 
In his paper entitled "Panpsychism,"32 Nagel argues for that position on 
the basis of four premises, "each of which is more plausible than its denial, 
though perhaps not more plausible than the denial of panpsychism./33 The 
four premises are: 
1. Material composition: Living organisms are complex material sys-
tems, made exclusively of ordinary matter. 
2. Nonreductionism: Mental properties are not physical properties of 
the organism" and are not implied by physical properties alone. 
3. Realism: Mental properties really are properties of the organism 
(i.e., eliminativism is false), 
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4. Nonemergence: "There are no truly emergent properties of complex 
systems. All properties of a complex system that are not relations between 
it and something else derive from the properties of its constituents and 
their effects on each other when so combined."" 
Nagel then goes on to say: 
Panpsychism seems to follow from these four premises. If the 
mental properties of an organism are not implied by any physical 
properties but must derive from properties of the organism's con-
stituents, then those constituents must have nonphysical properties 
from which the appearance of mental properties follows when the 
combination is of the right kind. Since any matter can compose an 
organism, all matter must have these properties. And since the 
same matter can be made into different types of organisms with 
different types of mental life (of which we have encountered only a 
tiny sample), it must have properties that imply the appearance of 
different mental phenomena when the matter is combined in dif-
ferent ways. This would amount to a kind of mental chemistry.3b 
For our purposes the crucial premises of Nagel'S argument are 
Nonreductionism and Nonemergence. Unfortunately, Nagel's explana-
tions of these premises (especially Nonemergence) are not as clear as one 
might wish, so we shall need to sharpen the focus. Furthermore, the inter-
pretations of the two premises must be related in a certain way if the argu-
ment is to succeed. Nonemergence states that the properties of wholes must 
be related to the properties of parts in a certain way, and Nonreductionism 
states that the mental properties of persons cannot be derived from the 
physical properties of matter. So for the argument to work, the sense in 
which mental properties can't be derived from physical properties has to 
be the same as the sense in which mental properties have to be accounted 
for by some properties of matter, thus forcing the ascription of mental (or 
proto-mental) properties to the ultimate constituents of matter. 
According to Nonreductionism, mental properties are not physical 
properties and are not implied by physical properties alone. It seems most 
natural and plausible to take "implied by" here as representing logical 
implication, and we shall so understand it. But if so, then Nonemergence 
must be understood as requiring that the properties of a whole are logical-
ly implied by the properties of its parts. According to James Van Cleve, 
however, this 
is setting the standards for explainability extremely high. If a prop-
erty of a whole that follows only with nomological necessity from 
the properties of its parts is held on that score to be inexplicable, 
won't we have to sav the same about anv effect that does not fol-
low with logical nec~ssity from its cause? If so, the momentum of 
Nagel's argument will be such that it can't be stopped short of 
complete causal rationalism-Spinoza's view that causes and effects 
are related by logical necessity. This is a view that few philoso-
phers nowadays would embrace.37 
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Van Cleve concedes, however, that there is a way to defend Nagel's 
premise short of this. If we distinguish between determinative relations 
which hold at a time and those which hold over time, then it may be more 
plausible to insist on the relation of logical implication between the proper-
ties of a whole and those of its parts for synchronic than for diachronic 
relations. "The argument against causal rationalism is at its strongest in 
the case of effects that succeed their causes in time; for how can what hap-
pens at one moment have any logically necessary connection with what 
happens at any other?"3B Nevertheless, Van Cleve finds even this weaker 
requirement (which he terms "mereological rationalism") to be implausi-
bly strong; he holds that "there is no reason why emergent properties can't 
follow with nomological necessity from properties of the parts, and in that 
case they would not be inexplicable for anyone but a causal rationalist."o'! 
Now mereological rationalism, as defined by Van Cleve, is equivalent to 
the principle of reducibility discussed earlier in this paper. So it becomes 
necessary for me to explain why the requirement of logical reducibility, as 
stated by that principle, is the correct one, and should not be replaced by 
Van Cleve's weaker requirement of nomological reducibility. 
Causes may in some sense necessitate their effects, but the connection 
does not seem to be one of logical or conceptual necessity; thus causal 
rationalism is implausible. But the principle of reducibility does not 
require causal rationalism. Suppose that in a complex whole there are two 
properties, occurring simultaneously, which are linked by nomological 
necessity. Note that the principle of reducibility does not, so far, require a 
logical connection between these propelties. The connection between the 
two properties can be as opaque, conceptually speaking, as you please. 
However, if one of the hvo properties is said to be a property of the system 
as a whole, the principle poses a question: what exactly is it that has the 
property? By hypothesis, the whole simply is "in the strict sense, a system 
of objects"; there is no whole "over and above" the parts of which it is com-
posed. So whatever nonrelational properties the whole has must consist of 
properties of, and relations between, the parts; there simply is nothing else 
of which they could consist. If a property of the whole is not logically 
grounded in the properties of the parts, then it is "floating in mid-air," 
unattached to any real individual-but this is unintelligible. 
To see this more clearly, we briefly recapitulate the main argument. A 
person is aware of some complex object-say, a complicated visual field. 
By hypothesis, it is the person's body--specifically, her brain-that is 
aware of this object. Now, take the smallest region of the brain that con-
tains all the information for the visual field. This brain-region is a whole 
consisting of parts, but none of its proper parts can be aware of the visual 
field as a whole. And the properties of, and relations between the parts, do 
not logically imply that there is an awareness of the visual field. 
So far, Van Cleve would agree, but he urges that "there is no reason 
why emergent properties can't follow with nomological necessity from the 
properties of the parts." Now if one state of affairs follows from another 
with nomological necessity, it is because there is a causal process linking 
those two states of affairs. Causal processes, furthermore, occur in and/ or 
between concrete individual objects. So what concrete objects are available 
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for the causal processes which result in awareness of the visual field? 
There are the parts of the brain-region in question, of course-but the 
properties of, and relations between, the parts are already accounted for; 
by hypothesis they do not imply that there is an awareness of the visual 
field. And the brain as a whole is not an additional concrete object over and 
above its parts, any more than, in Gilbert Ryle's example, Oxford 
University is an additional object over and above the colleges, libraries, 
and so on of which it consists. So Van Cleve's causal processes either occur 
in and/ or between the parts of the brain, in which case they do IlOt imply 
awareness of the visual field, or they do not occur at all. 
Since this argument is crucial for the paper as a whole, it may be helpful 
to state it here in a semi-formalized version, as follows: 
Let 'p' designate a human being, by hypothesis a physical object consist-
ing of parts el, e2, .. en. 'Ap' says that p is aware of her visual field. 'R' is a 
complex relational predicate such that 'ReI, {2, .. en' describes all the prop-
erties of and relations between the parts of p. Ap is the state of affairs such 
that 'Ap' is true. 'Imply' stands for conceptual implication. 
1. Ret' ee, .. en and Ap, and ReI, e2, .. en 
does not imply Ap. 
2. ReI, e2, .. en causally necessitates Ap. 
3. There is a causal process (CP) connect-
ing ReI, e" .. en with Ap. 
4. CP consists of events involving con-
crete individuals. 
5. The concrete individuals involved in 
CP include at most el, e2, .. en and p. 
6. P is not a concrete individual distinct 
from et, e2, .. en 
7. The concrete individuals involved in 
CP include at most et, e2, .. en. 
S. All the events involving el, e2, .. en are 
already included in ReI, e2, .. en. 
9. CP is not a causal process that con-
nects ReI, ee, .. en with Ap. 
10. It is not the case that ReI, e2, .. en 
causally necessitates Ap. 
Provisional Assumption 
2 
5,6 
l,6,7,S 
2,9 indirect proof 
I conclude, in view of this, that the principle of reducibility (a.k.a. mere-
ological rationalism) is correct, and under this interpretation Nagel's argu-
ment appears to be successful. Ironically, however, the very principle that 
undergirds the argument also defeats the conclusion he seems to want to 
draw from it. Recall the reference to "mental chemistry," whereby matter 
has "properties that imply the appearance of different mental phenomena 
when the matter is combined in different ways." Nagel seems to assume 
that, once we attribute mental (or proto-mental) properties to the ultimate 
constituents of matter, it may indeed be possible to explain the mental 
properties of human beings (such as being aware of one's visual field) in 
terms of their parts in a way that satisfies the principle of reducibility (= 
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Nonemergence = mereological rationalism). But it's clear that this simply 
cannot be done; to repeat it once more, a person's being aware of a com-
plex object cannot consist of parts of the person being aware of parts of the 
object. So the result of Nagel's argument is indeed ironic: it defeats not 
only the materialist views he rejects, but also the "atomistic panpsychism" 
he intends it to support. 
IV 
The argument began with an appeal to the unity of consciousness, as 
exemplified by the phenomenon of one's awareness of one's visual field. 
In the light of the principle of reducibility it was argued that this awareness 
must be the experience of a unitary subject, one which is not decomposable 
into parts none of which possesses this awareness. This conclusion, in 
turn, rules out as unacceptable standard varieties of materialism, as well as 
panpsychism of the sort adumbrated by Nagel. Assuming all this is cor-
rect, what possibilities are left? 
Pretty obviously, standard varieties of substance dualism are not threat-
ened by the unity-of-consciousness argument, and adherents of such views 
may welcome the argument as support. Suppose, however, that for one 
reason or another one finds those options unappealing?40 There is, I want 
to suggest, another possibility, one which on first inspection is not all that 
distant from Nagel's panpsychism. Suppose we attribute to the fundamen-
tal constituents of matter (i.e., to matter-energy as such), not indeed con-
scious experience, but rather a certain potentiality for consciousness, a poten-
tiality which is realized given a certain kind (or, one of a range of appropri-
ate kinds) of arrangement of matter in a living organism. However, this 
potentiality will not take the form of "mental properties" of, say, quarks 
which, when appropriately combined, can yield our everyday garden vari-
ety mental properties in accordance with the principle of reducibility. This 
we have seen to be impossible. Rather, it is the potentiality to produce, 
under appropriate physical conditions, a new individual, a psychic unity 
which, in Sellars' terminology, is correlated with but does not consist of the 
particles of microphysics. Here a comparison can be drawn with such a 
familiar physical phenomenon as a magnetic field, which is correlated with 
but does not consist of the "system of objects" which is the generating mag-
net. Such an "emergent self" can, I would argue, play the role not only of 
the consciousness which is aware of the visual field, but of the acting sub-
ject of free moral choice. Such a view, which may be termed "emergent 
dualism," certainly runs the risk of becoming a philosophical orphan, 
rejected by dualists and materialists alike. On the other hand, I would 
argue that it ought to be more acceptable to dualists than any of the stan-
dard versions of materialism, and more acceptable to materialists than the 
usual kinds of dualism. But these are matters which require a great deal 
more discussion than is possible here. 
Nowhere in this discussion has appeal been made to considerations 
which are unique to Christian or theistic philosophy. Nevertheless, it will 
be evident that these are issues in which Christian philosophy has a major 
stake. And I believe that the self as conceived in emergent dualism is a 
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good candidate for the core of identity of a human person before God, and 
a plausible recipient for the promise of eternal life. If so, then there is much 
about this view that should interest us.4 ! 
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